ToC Elims AC

ToC Elims AC 1

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Framework Extensions 10

1AC

I affirm.

I value morality. Moral theories fundamentally divide as consequentialist and non-consequentialist. Non-consequentialists prescribe *patterns* of behavior—acting on the categorical imperative, manifesting virtues, respecting rights, etc.—to be instantiated by all agents in their own lives, even if the instantiation of that pattern results in the pattern being less fully realized overall. But, consequentialists reverse that order; consequentialists claim that the promotion of certain neutral values or patterns make an action right regardless of whether that pattern is instantiated in the agent’s own life.

Regardless of the type of theory, all moral judgments must be universalizable. If we think that it is right for one agent to act in a certain way in some circumstance, then that same judgment must hold for any similarly situated agent because there are no *a priori* morally relevant differences between agents.

Only consequentialism can meet this universalizability requirement. Universalizing non-consequentialism results in a conflict in normative reasons. Pettit

[Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University]. The Cost of Non-Consequentialism. February 5 , 1999. <http://www.philo.umontreal.ca/documents/cahiers/Pettit\_Non-Consequentialism.pdf>

Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalised, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context or whatever. So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non-particular or universal kind.

Thus, if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C — these may bear on the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like — then we assume that something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalisability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific: so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.

There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalisability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. Suppose that I accept consequentialis[m]t doctrine and believe of an agent that in their particular circumstances, C, he or she ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. If that option really is right by my consequentialist lights, then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O the right option for me in those circumstances, so they will make it the right option for any other agent in such circumstances. Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalisability. I can happily universalise my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalisability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I will only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he or she do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble. Universalisability would not force me to think that everyone ought to swim to the help of a child in such a situation; undoubtedly they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that anyone ought to swim to the help of the child; it only requires a person-by-person prescription, not a collective one. So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalisability. But how is the universalisability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? According to non-consequentialist theory, the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern, P; this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring their special obligations, or whatever. Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say of an agent — again, let us suppose, myself — that I ought to choose O in these circumstances, C, or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me — in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern, P — so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. The problem Suppose that I do say, in the straightforward way, that pattern P requires, not just that I do O in C, but also, for any agent whatsoever, that that [any] agent should do O in C as well. Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C.

This response is going to lead[s] me, as a non-consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that something is right gives one a normative reason to prefer it; the judgment of rightness must provide such a reason if it is to have an action-guiding role. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, then I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, then I commit myself — again, because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness — to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that [any] agent do O.

The problem with these reasons and these commitments, however, is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible that, perversely, the best way for me to ensure or increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent does O in C-type circumstances, is to choose non-O myself in those circumstances. The best way to satisfy the preference as to what the arbitrarily chosen agent should do may be to go against the preference as to what one should do oneself. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself; the best way to get people to help their own children may be not to press for the advantage of one’s own; the best way to minimise murder may to commit a murder; and so on. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern, P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself. The best way to increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent instantiates P may be not to instantiate P oneself. How can I avoid the conclusion that in such a perverse situation I ought to promote the overall instantiation of my cherished pattern, even at the cost of not instantiating it myself? How, in other words, am I to keep faith with the non-consequentialist commitment to the rightness of instantiating P, even where this means that the overall realisation of the pattern falls short of what it might have been? It is hardly going to be plausible for me to say that normative reasons bearing on preferences over my own choices trump normative reasons bearing on preferences over how other people behave. Both sorts of reasons are supported in the common language of what is the right choice or of what ought to be done. And it would surely run against the spirit of universalisability — the spirit in which I deny that my own particular identity is important to the prescription defended — to say that a reasoned preference as to what I do myself should not be responsive to a similarly reasoned preference as to what people in general do — what arbitrary agent, X, does — in the sorts of circumstances in question. The upshot is that if as a non-consequentialist theorist I straightforwardly universalise the prescription that in a certain situation I should instantiate a favoured pattern, P, then the prescription to which I thereby commit myself — that in that situation any X ought to instantiate pattern, P — may force me to revise my original self-prescription. I have equal reason to prefer both that I instantiate P and that any agent instantiate P — this reason is expressed by the use of the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ in each case — and the spirit of universalisability blocks me from treating myself as in any way special. Thus, if the preferences are inconsistent in a certain situation — if the choice is between my instantiating P alone, for example, or my acting so that many others instantiate P instead — then I will have reason not to instantiate P myself.

As a would-be non-consequentialist thinker, my initial claim must have been that the point is to instantiate P in my own life, not promote it generally. But I countenance the general claims of the P-pattern when I universalise in the straightforward way: I prescribe general conformity to that pattern, not just conformity in my own case. Thus it now seems that what I must think is that this general conformity is to be promoted, even if that means not myself instantiating the pattern in my own behaviour or psychology or relationships. It seems that what I must embrace, in effect, is a consequentialism in which conformity to pattern P is the ultimate value to be promoted.

Thus the standard is consequentialism.

We all believe that we ought morally make the world better when we can—the burden of proof is on them to show otherwise. Thus, winning reasons to reject their standard is sufficient reason to default to the AC even if I do not win proactive reason to prefer mine.

Sinott-Armstrong (Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, "Consequentialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/consequentialism/>.)

Even if consequentialists can accommodate or explain away common moral intuitions, that might seem only to answer objections without yet giving any positive reason to accept consequentialism. However, most people begin with the presumption that we morally ought to make the world better when we can. The question then is only whether any moral constraints or moral options need to be added to the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning. (Kagan 1989, 1998) If no objection reveals any need for anything beyond consequences, then consequences alone seem to determine what is morally right or wrong, just as consequentialists claim.

Only consequentialism can account for the fact that there are differing degrees of rightness and wrongness.

Alexander (Larry Alexander, “Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments,” *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 25 (2008).

In the moral realm, our deontic judgments are usually (always?) binary. An act (or omission) is either morally forbidden or morally permissible. Yet the determination of an act’s deontic status frequently turns on the existence of properties that are matters of degree. In what follows I shall give several examples of binary moral judgments that turn on scalar properties, and I shall claim that these examples should puzzle us. How can the existence of a property to a specific degree demarcate a boundary between an act’s being morally forbidden and its not being morally forbidden? Why aren’t our moral judgments of acts scalar in the way that the properties on which those judgments are based are scalar, so that acts, like states of affairs, can be morally better or worse rather than right or wrong? I conceive of this inquiry as operating primarily within the realm of normative theory. Presumably it will give aid and comfort to consequentialists, who have no trouble mapping their binary categories onto scalar properties. For example, a straightforward act utilitarian, for whom one act out of all possible acts is morally required (and hence permissible) and all others morally forbidden, can, in theory at least, provide an answer to every one of the puzzles I raise. And, in theory, so can all other types of act and rule consequentialists. They will find nothing of interest here beyond embarrassment for their deontological adversaries. The deontologists, however, must meet the challenges of these puzzles. And for them, the puzzles may raise not just normative questions, but questions of moral epistemology and moral ontology. Just how do we know that the act consequentialist’s way of, say, trading off lives against lives is wrong? For example, do we merely intuit that taking one innocent, uninvolved person’s life to save two others is wrong? Can our method of reflective equilibrium work if we have no theory to rationalize our intuitions? And what things in the world make it true, if it is true, that one may not make the act consequentialist’s tradeoff? I do not provide any answers to these questions any more than I provide answers to the normative ones. But they surely lurk in the background.

Contention One is Deterrence

First, deadly force is key to criminal justice reform

Clark (Natalie Loder Clark, [Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. LL.M., Columbia University, 1973; J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, 1972; B.A., State University of New York-Albany, 1963.] Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victimsand Perpetuating Violence, 28. 1987.)

The criminal justice system already effectively deals with domestic violence culminating in murder. Fortunately, people take murder seriously, even when it occurs in a domestic setting. Unfortunately, however, murder within the family is not usually seen as the predictable end of domestic violence. 81 If it were so seen, criminal prosecution of abusers would be common. The use of vigorous criminal prosecution in cases where domestic violence has not yet reached murderous consequences would reduce the number of such murders, both those committed by unchecked abusers and those committed by desperate victims who see no other available protection for themselves

Second, Deadly forces deters further domestic abuse—each death results in 7.5 fewer murders

Southwick (Southwick, Jr., Lawrence. *Guns and Justifiable Homicide: Deterrence and Defense.* Saint Louis University Public Law Review. 1999. Accessed Lexis-Nexis.)

From an initial look at these data it would seem that the risk of death at the hands of either the police or civilians would be of obvious concern to felons. It is evident that executions provide a disincentive to commit murder, as found by Ehrlich (1975) who found that each execution deterred approximately seven to eight murders. Of course, justifiable homicides by police and by civilians are not solely in response to murder but are the result of attempts to commit murder either directly or in the course of committing other crimes. However, if each execution and each justifiable homicide results in 7.5 fewer murders, the total of 697 justifiable homicides each year should have deterred over 5,200 murders each year. Compared with the approximately 21,500 murders actually occurring each year as shown in Table 2, this implies that the murder rate would have been about 24 percent higher without these justifiable homicides. The civilian justifiable homicides averaged 299 per year, which should have saved over 2,200 murders per year.

Contention Two is Patriarchy

A. Deadly force solves patriarchy. Mandating that the victim take some other option or avoid the violence just re-entrenches patriarchy. It’s try or die for the aff.

Gelderloos: Peter, How Nonviolence Protects the State, attended James Madison University, p. 66-8]

But a pacifist practice that forbids the use of any other tactics leaves no option for people who need to protect themselves from violence now. In the case of rape and other forms of violence against women, nonviolence implies the same lessons that patriarchy has taught for millennia. It glorifies passivity, "turning the other cheek," and "dignified suffering" among the oppressed. In one of the most lucid texts defining the preservation and implementation of patriarchy—the Old Testament—story upon commandment upon parable upon law counsel women to suffer injustice patiently and pray for the divine Authority to intervene. (This prescription is remarkably similar to pacifists' faith in the corporate media to disseminate images of dignified suffering and motivate the "decision-making authority" to implement justice). Because patriarchy clearly prescribes a one-sided male violence, women would be disrupting this power dynamic, not reinforcing it, by relearning their propensity for violence." To reiterate, women reclaiming the ability and right to use force would not by itself end patriarchy, but it is a necessary condition for gender liberation, as well as a useful form of empowerment and protection in the short term.

B. Self-defense is the internal link to cultural spillover to solve patriarchy

Heberle (Renee Heberle . Deconstructive Strategies and the Movement against Sexual Violence. Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 4, Women and Violence (Autumn, 1996), pp. 63-76)

Further, when women who are battered act violently in self-defense it becomes news. It becomes a story about an innocent woman being victimized who, out of irrational desperation, strikes back and happens to kill her abuser. Encouraging stories of successful prevention and resistance as reasonable and necessary rather than as only desperate and irrational can lead to increased knowledge about the contradictions and fissures in the logic of the rape script and contribute to the general deconstruction of identifications of women with real sexual vulnerability and men with real sexual power.

C. Patriarchy causes extinction.

Reardon 93

(Betty A. Reardon, Director of the Peace Education Program at Teacher’s College Columbia University, 1993, Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security, p. 30-2 (PDNSS6401))

In an article entitled “Naming the Cultural Forces That Push Us toward War” (1983), Charlene Spretnak focused on some of the fundamental cultural factors that deeply influence ways of thinking about security. She argues that patriarchy encourages militarist tendencies. Since a major war now could easily bring on massive annihilation of almost unthinkable proportions, why are discussions in our national forums addressing the madness of the nuclear arms race limited to matters of hardware and statistics? A more comprehensive analysis is badly needed . . . A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay—all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used. (Spretnak 1983)

Contention Three is International Security

Women security against gender violence is the internal link to global stability—solves a litany of global impacts.

Hudson 4/24 (Valerie M, What Sexs Mean for World Peace, Valerie M. Hudson is professor andGeorge H.W. Bush chair in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M , .http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/24/what\_sex\_means\_for\_world\_peace?page=full)

Well, here is some robust empirical evidence that we cannot ignore: Using the largest extant database on the status of women in the world today, which I created with three colleagues, we found that there is a strong and highly significant link between state security and women's security. In fact, the very best predictor of a state's peacefulness is not its level of wealth, its level of democracy, or its ethno-religious identity; the best predictor of a state's peacefulness is how well its women are treated. What's more, democracies with higher levels of violence against women are as insecure and unstable as nondemocracies. Our findings, detailed in our new book out this month, Sex and World Peace, echo those of other scholars, who have found that the larger the gender gap between the treatment of men and women in a society, the more likely a country is to be involved in intra- and interstate conflict, to be the first to resort to force in such conflicts, and to resort to higher levels of violence. On issues of national health, economic growth, corruption, and social welfare, the best predictors are also those that reflect the situation of women. What happens to women affects the security, stability, prosperity, bellicosity, corruption, health, regime type, and (yes) the power of the state. The days when one could claim that the situation of women had nothing to do with matters of national or international security are, frankly, over. The empirical results to the contrary are just too numerous and too robust to ignore. But as we look around at the world, the situation of women is anything but secure. Our database rates countries based on several categories of women's security from 0 (best) to 4 (worst). The scores were assigned based on a thorough search of the more than 130,000 data points in the WomanStats Database, with two independent evaluators having to reach a consensus on each country's score. On our scale measuring the physical security of women, no country in the world received a 0. Not one. The world average is 3.04, attesting to the widespread and persistent violence perpetrated against women worldwide, even among the most developed and freest countries. The United States, for instance, scores a 2 on this scale, due to the relative prevalence of domestic violence and rape. It's ironic that authors such as Steven Pinker who claim that the world is becoming much more peaceful have not recognized that violence against women in many countries is, if anything, becoming more prevalent, not less so, and dwarfs the violence produced through war and armed conflict. To say a country is at peace when its women are subject to femicide -- or to ignore violence against women while claiming, as Pinker does, that the world is now more secure -- is simply oxymoronic. The Worst Places to Be a Woman Gender-based violence is unfortunately ingrained in many cultures, so much so that it can take place not only during a woman's life but also before she is even born. On our scale measuring son preference and sex ratio, the world average is 2.41, indicating a generalized preference for sons over daughters globally. And in 18 countries, from Armenia to Vietnam, childhood sex ratios are significantly abnormal in favor of boys. The United Nations Population Fund suggests that, as of 2005, more than 163 million women were missing from Asia's population, whether through sex-selective abortion, infanticide, or other means. Demographer Dudley Poston of Texas A&M University has calculated that China will face a deficit of more than 50 million young adult women by the end of the decade. Think of the ways this imbalance will affect China's state stability and security -- and in turn its rise to world power -- in this century.

Outweighs all their offense, even if we only reduce violence in the United States that’s stil a huge decrease in it’s potential for global conduct—US security obviously affects the entire international system.

International stability solves nuclear war—interstate aggression with the nuclear option means there is always a risk—only way to avoid extinction

Morgan 09 (Dennis Ray Morgan \* Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea, Elsevier, Futures 41 (2009) 683–693, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race”)

Besides the accidental factor, another factor that could incite nuclear war is that of aggression. When nuclear powers are involved in wars of aggression, the nuclear option is always available. Especially when a nuclear power explicitly states that ‘‘all options are on the table,’’ concern about the nuclear option is well founded. Thus, Moore defines the aggressive factor as when ‘‘one or more nations decide to use weapons against a nuclear or non-nuclear nation in order to promote an economic, political or military goal, as part of an ongoing war or as a first strike nuclear attack. (The state, of course, may claim it is a pre- emptive, retaliatory or even accidental attack.)’’ [10].5 Especially in light of the recent U.S. attack on Iraq (ideologically based on Bush’s preventative war doctrine), the ‘‘pre-emptive’’ factor in instigating a nuclear war should be taken seriously. It is when one or more nations believe, whether correctly or incorrectly, or claims to believe ‘‘that another nuclear nation is about to use nuclear weapons against its nuclear, military, industrial or civilian targets and preemptively attacks that nation.’’

And, Ethical agnosticism should lead us to default towards preventing extinction as a meta-constraint on all ethical theories. Since we presently lack definitive grounds for believing any particular moral theory, we should default to rules, which maximize our ability to continue to engage in moral reasoning and chance of finding demonstrable moral truths. Bostrom

“These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest[s] an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our **[**that our] present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving**—**and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best wayavailable to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value

Also, this doesn’t contradict the util fw it justifies it--Util is the only framework which maximizes our ability to engage in ethical reasoning because it preserves the greatest amount of existence. This means the Bostrom card justifies extinction first and/or that util is true.

And, normative uncertainty demands that we take existential risks seriously even under non-consequentialist ethical frameworks provided only that we assign some form of consequentialism a non-zero credence. Bostrom explains:

“There will be some types of putative existential risks for which the main uncertainty is evaluative and others where the main uncertainty is descriptive (e.g., how likely an event is to occur or what consequences it would have). With regard to descriptive uncertainty, we saw earlier that if something is not known to be objectively safe, it is risky, at least in the subjective sense relevant to decision making. We can make a parallel move with regard to normative uncertainty. Suppose that some event X would reduce biodiversity. Suppose (for the sake of illustration) it is known that X **[**but] would have no other significant consequences and that the reduced biodiversity would not affect humans or any other morally considerable beings. Now, we may be uncertain whether biodiversity has final value (is valuable “for its own sake”). Hence we may be uncertain [and hence] about whether or not X would really be bad. Butwe can say that if we are not sure whether or not X would really be bad (but we are sure that X would not be good), then X is bad in at least the subjective sense relevant to decision making.”

Thus, any argument for discounting the moral value of future lives or the badness of extinction would have to achieve an impossibly high-justified credence level to overwhelm the magnitude of ethical risk of extinction. This also preempts skepticism since any degree of moral risk generates a normative reason to act in the absence of competing reasons

Contention Four is Individuals

A. The impacts to domestic violence are horrific and experienced by 1.3 million women.

NCADV 07 (“Domestic Violence Facts.” National Coalition Against Domestic Violence. Every Home a Safe Home. NCADV Public Policy Office, Washington D.C. July 2007.”)

Domestic violence is the willful intimidation, physical assault, battery, sexual assault, and/or other abusive behavior perpetrated by an intimate partner against another. It is an epidemic affecting individuals in every community, regardless of age, economic status, race, religion, nationality or educational background. Violence against women [It] is often accompanied by emotionally abusive and controlling behavior, and thus is part of a systematic pattern of dominance and control. Domestic violence [It] results in physical injury, psychological trauma, and sometimes death. The consequences of domestic violence can cross generations and truly last a lifetime. One in every four women will experience domestic violence in her lifetime. 1 An estimated 1.3 million women are victims of physical assault by an intimate partner each year. 2 85% of domestic violence victims are women. 3 Historically, females have been most often victimized by someone they knew. 4 Females who are 20-24 years of age are at the greatest risk of nonfatal intimate partner violence. 5 Most cases of domestic violence are never reported to the police. 6 Witnessing violence between one’s parents or caretakers is the strongest risk factor of transmitting violent behavior from one generation to the next. 7 Boys who witness domestic violence are twice as likely to abuse their own partners and children when they become adults. 8 30% to 60% of perpetrators of intimate partner violence also abuse children in the household. 9 One in 6 women and 1 in 33 men have experienced an attempted or completed rape. 10 Nearly 7.8 million women have been raped by an intimate partner at some point in their lives. 11 Sexual assault or forced sex occurs in approximately 40-45% of battering relationships. 12 1 in 12 women and 1 in 45 men have been stalked in their lifetime. 13 81% of women stalked by a current or former intimate partner are also physically assaulted by that partner; 31% are also sexually assaulted by that partner. 13 Almost one-third of female homicide victims that are reported in police records are killed by an intimate partner. 14 In 70-80% of intimate partner homicides, no matter which partner was killed, the man physically abused the woman before the murder. 12 Less than one-fifth of victims reporting an injury from intimate partner violence sought medical treatment following the injury. 15 Intimate partner violence results in more than 18.5 million mental health care visits each year. 16 The cost of intimate partner violence exceeds $5.8 billion each year, $4.1 billion of which is for direct medical and mental health services. 17 Victims of intimate partner violence lost almost 8 million days of paid work because of the violence perpetrated against them by current or former husbands, boyfriends and dates. This loss is the equivalent of more than 32,000 full-time jobs and almost 5.6 million days of household productivity as a result of violence. 17 There are 16,800 homicides and $2.2 million (medically treated) injuries due to intimate partner violence annually, which costs $37 billion. 18 Domestic violence is one of the most chronically underreported crimes. 20 Only approximately one-quarter of all physical assaults, one-fifth of all rapes, and one-half of all stalkings perpetuated against females by intimate partners are reported to the police. 1 Approximately 20% of the 1.5 million people who experience intimate partner violence annually obtain civil protection orders. 1 Approximately one-half of the orders obtained by women against intimate partners who physically assaulted them were violated. 1 More than two-thirds of the restraining orders against intimate partners who raped or stalked the victim were violated.

Contention Five is Only Deadly force solves

First, Deadly force solves

Thompson 99 (Martie P. Thompson,1 Thomas R. Simon,2 Linda E. Saltzman,2 and James A. Mercy2. Epidemiology of Injuries among Women after Physical Assaults: The Role of Self-protective Behaviors. Copyright C 1999 by The Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health All rights reserved)

We also conducted two parallel multivariate logistic regression models to determine whether selfprotective behavior reduced the risk of both minor injuries (i.e., bruises, cuts, scratches, swellings, chipped teeth) and severe injuries (i.e., knife or stab wounds, gunshot wounds, broken bones or teeth, internal injuries, unconsciousness). Consistent with NCVS coding, for "unspecified injuries," women with hospital stays of 0-2 days were classified as incurring minor injuries, and those with hospital stays of greater than 2 days were classified as incurring severe injuries. A woman's use of self-protective behavior significantly reduced her risk of incurring a minor injury (adjusted odds ratio (AOR) = 0.42, 95 percent confidence interval (CI): 0.30, 0.57). Although the use of self-protective behaviors also [and] reduced the odds that a woman incurred a severe injury, this was not statistically significant (AOR = 0.64, 95 percent CI: 0.29, 1.38). In the final model for the self-protective-traditional measure, self-protective behaviors continued to manifest a positive, but statistically nonsignificant, effect on risk of injury. A similar pattern emerged for the other covariates. Relationship status, victim's education, and offender weapon use were the only significant risk factors for injury. The nature of their effects on injury risk were similar to their effects in the model with the self-protective-revised measure. Women who engaged in self-protective behaviors were also asked whether they believed any of their actions helped the situation in any way and whether any of their actions made the situation worse in any way (women could indicate that the self-protective behavior helped the situation and that the self-protective behavior made the situation worse, so these variables were not mutually exclusive). Seventy-five percent of women who engaged in a self-protective behavior reported that their use of self-protective behaviors) helped the situation. Of these women, 57 percent reported that the behavior(s) was helpful in avoiding injury or greater injury, 21 percent reported that the self-protective behaviors) helped scare or chase the offender off, 25 percent reported that the behavior(s) helped them get away from the offender, 7 percent reported that the behavior helped them protect other people, and 16 percent reported that the behaviors) helped the situation in some other way.

Second, Non-deadly force invites retaliation. Deadly force is the unique solution

Ayyildiz (Elisabeth Ayyildiz. “When Battered Women’s Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: The Battered Woman As Vigilante.” Journal of Gender and the Law, Vol. 4:141, Fall 1995. [J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1995; B., University of Virginia, 1991.)

To some, the death of the abuser may seem an inappropriate or excessive way for the battered woman vigilante to punish her abuser and repair the social order. Deadly force on the part of the battered woman, however, may be justified in several ways. First, death may be necessary because lesser degrees of force may be insufficient. The battered woman may not be able to confront the batterer without a deadly weapon because of disparities in size, strength or emotional control. The lower degree of force a woman typically exerts upon a man may have little or no impact on a physically stronger abuser. Indeed, a woman's lesser degree of force [and] may only incite a vicious retaliation by the abuser.

Third, Pacifism is just an excuse for those in power to continue oppress the victims—the implication is that the AC controls the only internal link to solvency.

Fiala (Andrew Fiala. “Pacifism.” SEP. 2010.)

This objection holds that the reason pacifists advocate nonviolence is that they are afraid of suffering from violence; or that they are too lazy or self-interested to take up arms to fight. This objection focuses on the motivation and psychology of pacifists and accuses pacifists of the vice of cowardice. Moreover, such an objection may also argue that pacifists are egoists who are too selfish to do what is required to serve justice, protect the innocent, and defend the nation. The free rider objection adds that pacifists benefit from social goods that are produced through military power, while they contribute nothing substantial to the production of these goods. This objection thus claims that pacifism is unjust since pacifists share in social benefits, without also taking up the burdens and obligations that are tied to these benefits. Related to this is the charge that pacifism is unpatriotic and even treasonous. The concern here is that if pacifists are unwilling to fight to defend the nation, then they effectively betray the nation and help the enemy. As Jan Narveson has recently put this, pacifists have “too many friends” (Narveson 2003) since they are unwilling to take up arms against their enemies. A more forceful ad hominem argument against pacifism can be found in Ward Churchill's idea that pacifism is a pathology of the privileged. This objection holds that it is easy for those who are not oppressed to advocate nonviolence and indeed, that the powerful can use the ideology of pacifism as a tool with which to further oppress those who are unwilling to take up arms in defense of human rights.

Fourth, Domestic violence resources don’t stop the abuse—they just prevent victims from protecting themselves

Dugan et al. 03 (Laura Dugan et al, funded by the National Institute of Justice and the National Consortium of Violence, Law & Society Review, 2003, http://www.andrews.edu/~rbailey/Chapter%2016/9653133.pdf)

Other research has utilized comparative designs that incorporate data for several types of domestic violence resources from a large number of jurisdictions. Browne and Williams (1989) examined the effects of domestic violence services and legislation on intimate-partner homicide rates using state-level cross-sectional data. Their ﬁndings indicate some policy impact: greater service availability is signiﬁcantly associated with a lower rate of married women killing their husbands. However, service availability was not found to be related to lower rates of men killing their wives (see Browne, Williams, & Dutton 1999 for discussion). The ﬁnding of divergent effects of domestic violence services on intimate-partner homicide by gender was replicated in a longitudinal analysis of intimate-partner homicide victimization in 29 large U.S. cities (Dugan, Nagin, & Rosenfeld 1999). The authors found that legal advocacy services are associated with reduced victimization for married men, but not for women (Dugan, Nagin, & Rosenfeld 1999). The above studies reach an ironic conclusion: resources designed to protect women from violent men appear to have a stronger role in keeping men from being killed by their partners. Men’s homicidal behavior toward female intimates statistically remains the same regardless of the amount of resources available to battered women. Although there are clear social beneﬁts to averting both the murder of men and the likely incarceration of the female perpetrator, the null female ﬁndings suggest that policy enhancements are needed to dramatically increase the safety of women in relationships with men.

Prefer the evidence—reflects the sentiments of multile studies regarding the availability and efficacy of domestic violence services

Fifth, leaving the abuser causes more harm—deadly force is the safest available option.

Koons (Koons, Judith E. [Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law]. Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving Intimate Battery and Deadly Legal Doctrines. Journal of Law and Policy, 2006.)

The unworkability of a retreat rule is manifest when considering the phenomenon of separation assault. Legal scholars have defined separation assault as "the attack on the woman's body and volition in which her partner keeps her from leaving, retaliates for the separation, or forces her to return." The concept of separation assault recognizes that patterns of violence, already dramatic, often increase upon a woman's separation from a battering man. According to the Department of Justice, seventy-five percent of assaults occur when the abused party is divorced or separated from the abuser. Another study indicates that forty-five percent of murders of women arise out of a man's "rage over the actual or impending estrangement from his partner." Women who are separated from their spouses are three times more likely to be attacked than divorced women and twenty-five times more likely to be attacked than married women. Even a limited retreat rule, as had been carved out by the Florida Supreme Court, places women at increased risk of violence. It is at the moment of separation - the first physical move toward separation - that a battering man is prone to become more violent. A decision - or even a threat - to leave can trigger lethal violence. Because domestic violence is marked by power and control, attempting to exit a room may be considered "disobedience," spurring escalated violence. Resistance strategies (such as leaving a room) may force an abuser "to make his coercive power explicit. Any threat, however small, to the abuser's authority within the family is likely to be met with violence."According to one woman, "The best way to avoid [battering] was to show as little reaction as possible ... I didn't dare argue with him or challenge him - for fear of my life actually." Trying to exit past a raging man may be the final move of a woman seeking only to avoid violence. Killing a battering man may be the safest available alternative.

Framework Extensions

Extensions

1. Definition: Non-consequentialists prescribe patterns of behavior for all agents like acting on the categorical imperative or respecting rights; they hold that agents should follow these patterns in their own lives even if doing so results in less overall promotion of the pattern. Consequentialists hold the opposite view.
2. Meta-ethic:

(\_\_) Short extension: Moral judgments must be universalizable because there is no morally relevant difference between actors.

(\_\_) Long extension: Moral judgments must be universalizable. If we think that it is right for an agent to take an action is some circumstance, then that same judgment must hold for any similarly situated agent because there are no *a priori* morally relevant differences between agents. Two situations cannot demand different ethical responses without reference to differences in the situations themselves.

1. Pettit 2—Consequentialism is universalizable because if the consequences of my action make it right for me, then those consequences make that action right for anyone similarly situated. But the same line of reasoning fails for the non-consequentialist. If it is right for me to follow a pattern, then I have a normative reason to prefer that I follow the pattern, and when I universalize that judgment, I have a normative reason to prefer that anyone else does the same. These reasons conflict when the best way to ensure compliance is by not following it myself. I cannot give my reason to comply myself more weight because of the universalizability requirement, so I must prescribe general conformity to the pattern—and that’s just consequentialism.